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Abstract of the paper  
This paper examines the consequences of the transformations of extension services for small-
scale farms. It presents the results of investigations embedded in regulation theory, which 
combine a comparative institutional analysis, statistical data processing (national agricultural 
census) and direct surveys. We describe the transformations in the EU and show that they 
make it more difficult for small farms to access extension services and to benefit from “front-
office” support (i.e. direct advice from extensionists). Finally, we emphasize that due to the 
modification of the knowledge production regime, these small farms may also suffer new 
specific adverse effects resulting from the re-organization of the "back-office" R&D activities 
of  these  extension  services  (i.e.  knowledge  base  updating,  database  building,  scientific 
experiments, etc.).  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As European agriculture is characterized by a wide structural heterogeneity, the dimensional 
threshold that defines the notion of a "small-scale farm" varies from one country to the next. 
In  this  article  we  focus  on  the  smallest  farms  in  the  Eurofarm  European  database.  We 
therefore reserve the term "small-scale farm" mainly for those with fewer than 8 economic 
size units (ESU) when data in terms of this classification are available. 
 
In Europe the attention paid to small-scale farms under structural policies gradually declined 
with the success of modernization policies. Many countries nevertheless consider that this 
process is not complete, and that specific measures need to be developed to accompany the 
development  of  small-size  farms.  Moreover,  with  the  CAP  reform  of  1985,  the  Cork 
Conference  of  1998  and  the  Salzbourg  Declaration  (EC,  2003-a),  the  importance  of 
agriculture  for  maintaining  the  rural  economic  and  social  fabric  has  repeatedly  been 
reaffirmed, in debates on rural development and those on the multifunctionality of agricultural 
activity. From this perspective, small farms take on a new importance, for even though their 
contribution  to  agricultural  production  is  weak,  in  terms  of  volume,  in  many  European 
countries they correspond to a significant proportion of the family farm population (Laurent, 
2005; Renting et al., 2008) and play a specific part in the ecology of landscapes. 
 
At the same time, the technical and normative content of agricultural policies has increased, 
primarily  as  a  result  of  environmental  and  sanitary  regulations.  These  norms  raise  new 
technical problems for farmers and generate new needs for advice. For example, in the case of 
wheat, the level of mycotoxins acceptable in the agri-food industry is now strictly regulated 
(EC, 2000), but how can cereals be grown that contain no mycotoxins produced by fungi, 
when regulations limit the use of fungicides? Faced with this new type of problem, European 
farms of all sizes need technical support to find solutions suited to their production systems. It 
was  moreover  in  this  perspective  that  the  CAP  (EC,  2003-b)  reintroduced,  back  into 
community intervention, reflection on extension services that until then had been considered 
as  a  matter  of  national  subsidiarity.  That  is  also  why  many  studies  have  recently  been 
undertaken  to  assess  the  effects  of  privatization  of  large  national  agricultural  extension 
services on the productive and environmental performance of farms. Most of them however 
overlook the question of small-scale farms. Yet extensive empirical evidence shows that these 
farms suffer on account of this type of reorganization, even though the mechanisms producing 
such discrimination are not always clearly identified. 
 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on this problem. In the first part we consider the reasons 
for which the question of small farms is usually overlooked in economic analyses of the 
evolution of extension services. We then show, in the second part, that the question of target 
publics has gradually been pushed aside as national extension services have been privatized. 
The third part explains that the institutional reorganization accompanying this privatization 
has nevertheless transformed the conditions of small farms' access to front-office support (i.e. 
advice directly from extensionists, in face-to-face interaction). Finally, in Part 4 we show that 
this reorganization has also altered the way in which small farms are taken into account in 
back-office  activities  (R&D,  research  literature  surveys,  construction  of  databases,  and 
experimentation), which no longer guarantee to the same extent that appropriate, validated 
knowledge can be produced for these farms. 
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1. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. THE INVISIBILITY OF SMALL FARMS IN THE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EXTENSION SERVICES 
 
Most analyses of the reorganization of extension services in Europe overlook the question of 
small-scale farms. These farms are often excluded from the studies of agricultural economists, 
who claim that they are exclusively recreational or for own consumption. In some cases that is 
true.  However,  direct  observation  of  these  farms,  via  a  survey  (Laurent  &  Rémy,  1998; 
Laurent  et  al.,  1998),  shows  that  the  situation  is  more  complex,  and  that  a  significant 
proportion  of  these  farms  provide  rural  households  with  income  from  the  sale  of  their 
products. For instance, if we consider Type 13 of farming, "Specialist cereals, oilseed and 
protein crops", which rarely corresponds to recreational farming, we see that the proportion of 
agricultural holdings with fewer than 8 ESU remains large in almost all EU countries (cf Map 
in annex 1). 
 
In  other  words,  some  small  farms  are  still  stakeholders  in  the  productive  dynamics  of 
agriculture. The functions assigned to them in agricultural and rural development policies 
(buffer role in situations of economic crisis, additional income for rural households, etc.) can 
be fulfilled only if they can practice this productive activity in the right conditions and carry 
on selling their produce. 
 
Other analysts do not specifically take small farms into account. They posit that the technical 
functioning of farms can be considered as "non scale-dependent". In the most recent studies, 
in  which  the  effect  of  extension  services  within  an  agricultural  production  function  is 
modelled, size is taken into account only as a continuous variable determining the levels of 
investment in extension services, among other inputs of the productive function (Dinar et al., 
2007).  The  effects  of  thresholds  or  steps  in  access  to  extension  services,  as  well  as  the 
differences of forms of learning to which they contribute for different groups of farms, are not 
taken into account. Finally, the very question of the target publics of extension services is 
overlooked,  and  market  regulation  is  expected  to  provide  an  optimum  allocation  of 
information to producers. 
 
The question of extension services to small farmers consequently remains a blind spot in 
agricultural economics. Few data and analyses exist on these farmers' demand for and access 
to such services. It would not be a problem if, on the whole, the mechanisms of access to 
agricultural extension services were the same for all farms. However, research that takes the 
characteristics of the beneficiaries of these services into account shows that this is not so. 
Small farms' access to extension services is weak even when their productive functions are 
affirmed. Moreover, this situation seems to be worsening.   
 
In the most recent general agricultural census, in 2000, in the Rhône-Alpes region of France 
which had a total of 52,600 agricultural holdings, a set of questions was added to the standard 
questionnaire
1,  to  evaluate  the  number  of  farms  that  had  regular  contact  with  extension 
services
2. The database thus constituted is a very rare example of an exhaustive census of 
farms' access to extension services. It enables us to link the structural characteristics of these 
farms to the different types of source of technical support. Results of other studies (Laurent & 
                                                 
1 The basic questionnaire corresponds to the Eurostat/Eurofarm questionnaire with, in addition, national and 
regional questions. 
2 The data collected are statements on extension services. Farmers were asked whether they had had at least three 
contacts (face-to-face or by phone) during the preceding 12 months with an extensionist and, if so, with what 
type of extensionist (chamber of agriculture, cooperative, etc.).   4 
Mundler, 2005; Mundler et al., 2006) show that a very large proportion of small-scale farms 
have no regular contact with any kind of extension service whatsoever. This includes the offer 
of extension services by development agencies (mainly chambers of agriculture) which is 
free-of-charge or almost. 
 
Figure 1 shows that for the "Specialist cereals, oilseed and protein crops" and "General field 
cropping" types  of farming, where most small farms have a  productive purpose (and are 
concerned  by  problems  such  as  mycotoxin  (Duflot,  2004)),  access  to  free  advice  from 
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Figure 1. Proportion of farms declaring in 2000 that they benefit from regular contact with an extensionist 
from a development organization (percentage of farms of each class of economic size), for the total 
population of agricultural holdings, in two farm types: "Specialist cereals, oilseed and protein crops" and 
"General field cropping", Rhône-Alpes region, France (Source: Agricultural census 2000, special processing 
INRA-SAD). 
 
Data provided by the regional agro-environmental programme set up in Italy by the Tuscany 
region (Regione Toscana, 2002-2006) show that not only do small farms have less access than 
others  to  extension  services,  but  also  that  this  situation  can  worsen.  They  indicate  the 
evolution of the distribution of agricultural holdings which apply for subsidized extension 
services. We see that, in relative terms, this demand remains constant or increases for average 
or large-scale farms. The number of farms officially requiring extension services is decreasing 
less than the total number of farms. On the other hand, for the smallest farms the opposite 
tendency appears: the number of farms requesting advice is declining steeply whereas the 
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Figure 2: Comparison between the annual evolution of the number of farms in Tuscany and the evolution 
of the demand for subsidized extension services  
Source: (/Eurofarm/Regione Toscana 2002-2006). Additional methodological note in Annex 1. 
 
In these two examples, a significant proportion of small farms with productive functions need 
agricultural advice, especially to cope with new sanitary and environmental constraints. Yet 
they no longer have any easily measurable direct contact with existing extension services
3. 
 
This finding may be deemed to be of little interest if we posit that the difficulties of access to 
advice may be offset by a diffusion of available knowledge and information, from the biggest 
farms, which have easy access to extension services, to the smallest ones. It has in fact been 
shown (Darré 1986) that, in the circulation of information, relations with neighbours and 
other  colleagues,  such  as  requests  for  general  sources  of  information  (farming  reviews, 
specialized radio or TV programmes, etc.) are a reality. But for many technical problems, 
these forms of access to knowledge clearly cannot replace professional extension services. 
 
For many technical problems, the solutions envisaged and their implementation often depend 
on  the  size  of  the  agricultural  holding.  A  typical  example  is  the  struggle  against  the 
concentration of mycotoxins in cereals. Research has shown agricultural practices
4 to be a 
determining factor in explaining risk levels and devising solutions (Massé and al., 2002). But 
the changes to agricultural practices that are recommended as solutions require investments in 
machinery  (management  of  crop  residues),  expenditures  on  operating  costs  (varieties, 
phytosanitary products) or quantities of work that small farms cannot always afford. Hence, 
these solutions cannot be transposed and the diffusion of related knowledge has little interest 
for small farms. This example is no exception. In general, in both crop and livestock farming, 
we  find  that  for  a  large  number  of  problems  the  technical  solutions  that  farmers  can 
implement depend on the size of their farm and the quantity of work carried out on it. 
 
                                                 
3 The number of individual contacts between a farmer and an extensionist can be measured more easily than 
relations such as farmers' occasional participation in collective information meetings. 
4 For instance: choice of varieties, working the land, choice of crop rotation, etc.   6 
It is therefore necessary to analyse more precisely the mechanisms through which current 
changes to extension services can accentuate small farms' difficulties in obtaining access to 
appropriate knowledge. But for that purpose we need to mobilize theoretical knowledge that 
takes into account information which seems decisive for understanding these mechanisms, for 
extension services are a resource that can be described in different ways. 
 
While extension services are considered as simply an exchange of information that can be 
equated to goods, the cost of such services for a farmer can be seen as a material investment. 
Micro-economic models can thus be built to describe the modalities of allocation of such 
goods. These models are based on calculations of maximization of utility functions describing 
the  supply  and  demand  in  agricultural  extension  services.  The  disparities  of  access  to 
extension services can then be imputed to constraints on market regulation or interpreted as 
the result of an insufficient capacity to invest in time or capital (Carney, 1995). Yet such 
conceptual frameworks are based on the analysis of standardized situations where knowledge 
is exchanged through market relations. They have a low heuristic value for understanding 
concrete situations where extension services are delivered which mostly do not match this 
model (Hanson and Just, 2001). 
 
Many empirical analyses show that knowledge is co-constructed in relations between service 
providers  and  beneficiaries  (Gadrey,  1994),  according  to  modalities  which  are 
institutionalized in the form of operating rules. 
 
When advice is considered not simply as an exchange of goods but as a lever for knowledge 
production, investment in this service must be analysed as an intangible investment that can 
be defined as "a  detour via the production of knowledge which is lastingly embedded in 
objects, people and organizations" (Epingard, 2001). The forms of organization stemming 
from this process are not simply intended to meet the objectives of economic efficiency. They 
bring  into  play  asymmetries  of  power  and  conflicts  of  interest.  The  ways  in  which  the 
modalities of creation and distribution of knowledge are institutionalized can then be a source 
of disparities between farmers, for they express compromises which regulate conflicts, and 
are  a  stable  reflection  of  power  struggles  (Théret,  2000).  That  is  why  access  to  this 
knowledge, and to extension services, is an issue which cannot be analysed without taking 
into account the recent history of agricultural policy. 
 
2.  HISTORICAL  MILESTONES.  TAKING  INTO  ACCOUNT  SMALL  FARMS  IN 
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES OR EXTENSION PROGRAMMES 
 
2.1 Post-WWII modernization policies 
 
After the Second World War, national systems of agricultural extension services were set up 
in all European countries. These systems, which replaced more traditional ways of circulating 
knowledge in rural areas (demonstration farms, agricultural fairs), were organized differently 
in the various countries. However, since the strategic nature of food safety was foremost in all 
states' policies after the war, this technical support was financed to a large extent by public 
funds and/or by a system of additional taxes on the sales of farm produce or on land. 
 
The  emergence  of these extension service  systems was rooted in a more global dynamic 
where  the  terms  of  new  development  models  for  national  agricultures,  aimed  at  their 
modernization,  were  negotiated.  These  negotiations  involved  representatives  of  farmers’ 
unions and representatives of the state, as well as other actors in some cases. They covered all   7 
the  dimensions  of  agricultural  development  that  contribute  to  regulation  of  the  sector, 
including the management of structural inequalities, the stabilization of markets, and access to 
basic resources for production: land, capital, labour, and technical knowledge. The resulting 
compromises were institutionalized in regulations and laws that led to structured national 
agricultural extension services. 
 
Depending on the country, the compromises that were reached differed, and were strongly 
marked by the social characteristics of each national agricultural system and local balances of 
power. In particular, the weight of small farmers differed from one context to the next. Even 
if  the  history  of  European  national  agricultural  policies  is  strewn  with  examples  of 
programmes  targeted  at  small  farms,  the  modalities  of  this  insertion  were  widely 
heterogeneous. Hence, the rules of redistribution of funds for extension services, fed by fiscal 
or  parafiscal  taxes,  were  usually  institutionalized  in  commissions  on  which  ministries  of 
agriculture  and  producers'  unions  were  represented.  But  small  farmers  in  the  different 
countries did not have the same opportunities to make themselves heard and to have their 
interests recognized. 
 
In the Netherlands, for instance, there existed a plurality of farmers' unions, which allowed 
small farms significant representation on the commission steering the extension system. This 
was  concretized  by  the  establishment  of  a  specific  extension  service  for  adjusting  and 
intensifying the production systems of small farms (Labarthe 2006a). In France, on the other 
hand, where the dominant farmers' unions defended the interests of farms of all sizes, some 
small farmers were deliberately excluded from agricultural extension services. Either they 
failed to adhere to the modernization project based on the defence of family farming with two 
agricultural working units (pluri-active farmers, part-time farmers, farmers who refused to 
expand), or the heads of the extension services considered that for reasons relating to size or 
competencies, they could not attain this model (Van der Ban, 1984; Rémy, 1987). 
 
Apart from these disparities, what is worth noting is that small farms were unambiguously 
considered as part of the agricultural sector, even if local power relations were unfavourable 
to  the  defence  of  their  interests.  Their  inclusion  in  agricultural  extension  services  was  a 
subject of heated debate and profound political disagreement, but also a legitimate issue for 
agricultural economists and policy-makers. 
 
By comparison, the contemporary period seems to be marked by a paradox that needs to be 
elucidated: the newly recognized importance of small farms, on the one hand, and the decline 
of  debate  on  the  question  of  target  publics  of  extension  services,  evidenced  both  in  the 
scientific literature and in the state's disengagement in this respect. 
 
2.2 Disengagement of the state despite the rise of new issues related to small agricultural 
holdings 
 
In Europe we are currently witnessing a disengagement of member states from the funding, 
implementation  and  programming  of  agricultural  extension  on  a  national  scale.  This 
disengagement  has  very  different  forms  in  the  various  countries  (Laurent  et  al.,  2006; 
Labarthe, 2006) but is a general tendency, and everywhere new forms of contractualization of 
relations between the state, farmers' unions and extensionists are prevailing (Rivera and Zijp, 
2002). It is difficult to measure precisely the impact of these trends on the access to extension 
services for small farms. Their effects on the definition of the target publics of extension 
services in new technical support procedures can nevertheless be observed. It is impossible to   8 
account  in  detail  for  the  diversity  of  the  most  recent  institutional  changes  to  extension 
services,  but  these  have  often  been  radical,  especially  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  have  been 
described in other studies (see, in particular, Laurent et al., 2006; Labarthe, 2006a). Based on 
a set of studies in eight countries (cf. Table in Annex1) it is nevertheless possible to identify 
two main trajectories of state disengagement, and to analyse the consequences in terms of 
definition of target publics. 
 
- The first trajectory concerns countries in which a form of joint management and co-funding 
of extension services existed, between the ministry of agriculture and professional agricultural 
organizations,  during  the  agricultural  modernization  period  (e.g.  France,  the  Netherlands, 
Germany, Denmark and the UK). In these countries, where the modernization of farms is 
often  considered  to  be  complete,  the  state's  disengagement  and  the  reduction  of  funding 
through parafiscal taxes has been attended by a drastic decline of debate on the target publics 
of extension services. Moreover, many joint commissions on the programming of agricultural 
extension services, such as the Association Nationale de Développement Agricole (ANDA) in 
France, and the Landbouwshap in the Netherlands, have simply disappeared. Yet it was in 
these bodies that farmers’ unions were able to express themselves, and that the interests of 
various types of farmers came into contact. 
 
Professional organizations still play a coordinating role in agricultural extension services, but 
most of these are concerned with particular products and focus on certain categories of farm 
which produce large volumes for the sector. On the other hand, the heavier emphasis placed 
on environmental concerns leads to a policy of contractualized funding for extension services, 
on the basis of project validation by the ministries in charge of agriculture, food quality, 
and/or the environment. The definition of target publics is however contingent on the specific 
objectives of each project. 
 
The second trajectory concerns the Southern European countries in particular (Spain, Italy, 
Greece). It is characterized by various forms of decentralization of extension services, where 
the regions manage and fund these services (often with the help of structural funds of the CAP 
– CAP). In these countries, the structure and modernization of farms are still subjects of 
debate,  in  contexts  often  marked  by  the  presence  of  both  small  rural  farms  and  large 
specialized farming enterprises (Italy, Greece), or macrofundia-minifundia (south of Spain). 
Yet these countries have not been spared the wave of commercialization of extension services 
and  individual  billing  of  farmers.  This  tendency  can  adversely  affect  small  farms  by 
concentrating the offer on the most solvable ones with regard to the demands of profitability 
of a commercialized extension service supply. 
 
Overall, a distinct tendency has existed in the past fifteen years towards state disengagement 
from agricultural extension programmes and the deconstruction of loci of debate on the target 
public of such services. These loci of debate were places where the voices could be heard of 
farmers’unions, which took into account all aspects of the development of farms (production, 
income, social protection, etc.), as well as all types of farmers and certain farmers' unions 
specifically representing small-scale farms, as in the Netherlands and Germany. 
 
This trend has gone hand-in-hand with a relative loss of identity of small farms. Whereas in 
the sixties they were unambiguously considered as a part of the agricultural sector, and their 
role was discussed in modernization policies, in several countries that is not the case today. 
Since they now fall under social and rural policies, they are no longer within the scope of 
extension  services.  Yet  some  of  these  farms  are  still  productive.  Lacking  proactive   9 
professional representation, they are increasingly invisible, both in debates and in statistics 
(FADN – the Farm Accountancy Data Network). 
 
It was in this context that the European Commission first included extension services as a tool 
to accompany the CAP (EC 2003). It thus became mandatory for the member states to provide 
an Agricultural Advisory System (AAS) to ensure that farmers could obtain the information 
they required to implement the principles of eco-conditionality. While the content of advice 
produced  by  the  national  AAS  is  set  in  this  way,  its  modes  of  organization  and  the 
determination of its target publics is referred to national subsidiarity. The AAS were therefore 
designed not to support the modernization of farms, but as an additional guarantee to ensure 
that  farms  complied  with  the  environmental,  sanitary  and  animal  well-being  standards 
constituting eco-conditionality. Moreover, the regulation allows member states to subsidize 
access to extension services by proposing that the main target public be the farms receiving 
the most direct funding (over 15,000 euros). Hence, it is a minimum threshold for subsidies 
that is prescribed, and not a maximum one aiming at compensating for inequalities in terms of 
intangible investments. 
 
Since the state has started to disengage, the loci of debate on the constitution of the target 
publics of extension services have been eroded to a considerable extent. This erosion has 
undermined  access  to  services  for  small-scale  farms.  The  state's  disengagement  has  not 
simply been a matter of costs and reduction of public expenditures; it has also corresponded 
to a doctrine based on standard economic theories and the hypothesis of optimum efficiency 
of markets to regulate the extension service offer, assumed then to be demand-driven and 
closer to farmers' expectations (Knutson, 1986). But when it comes to services, the demand is 
not independent of the supply. Consequently, as we will see, the disappearance of loci in 
which  farmers’unions  can  express  themselves  and  coordinate  extension  services  has  not 
impacted only on the definition of the target publics of extension programmes. It has also had 
a direct influence on the actual content of knowledge that is co-constructed and proposed to a 
broader category of farmers. 
 
3. THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF SELECTION FOR ACCESS TO FRONT-OFFICE 
EXTENSION SERVICES 
 
3.1. The extensionist and the service relationship 
 
Few data enable us to evaluate farms' demand for and access to extension services, in relation 
to their structural characteristics (croplands, economic size, technico-economic orientation of 
production, etc.), especially since the question of access to services is absent from the large 
European agricultural statistics databases (EUROFARM, FADN). For example, the FADN 
does not enable us to identify expenditures for extension services, and supplies no data on 
small-scale farms in many countries. And even if such data did exist, to be fully exploitable it 
would have to be combined with indicators on the type of contact that farmers maintain with 
the extension services (number of meetings, type of service delivered, etc.). 
 
Access to extension services is not only a matter of costs and level of expenditures. When 
farmers are confronted with problems for which there is no standardized solution and they 
turn  to  an  extensionist,  new  knowledge  is  produced,  in  a  process  specific  to  intangible 
services  (Gadrey,  1994).  The  theoretical  and  empirical  results  of  research  in  various 
disciplines  (sociology,  ergonomics,  economics, communication  science)  consistently  show 
that  extension  services  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  simple  transfer  of  information  from   10 
extensionists to farmers or between farmers (Wolf et al., 2001). The knowledge that finally 
seems useful to mobilize in practice, after consultation between a farmer and an adviser, 
should rather be considered "as an endogenous process within economic mechanisms that 
should be treated not as a rare resource to which access has to be gained, but as the result of 
a production process" (Lemoigne, 1998). 
 
The observation of relations between farmers and extensionists (Cerf & Maxime, 2006) on a 
micro scale shows that they correspond to a co-production of knowledge. These relations 
make it possible to contextualize and formalize the problem precisely, in order to choose 
knowledge (especially scientific references) corresponding to the precise situation of each 
farm,  and  to  codify  and  evaluate  the  tacit  knowledge  that  farmers  have  of  their  own 
production systems and their environment. In other words, intangible services such as advice 
are based on interactions between service providers and beneficiaries, that is, on "service 
relations" (Goffman, 1968). In our case, farmers play an active part in designing adequate 
forms  of  action.  Their  intervention  determines  the  quality,  validity  and  relevance  of  the 
knowledge that is co-produced to support technical changes for increasing the performance of 
their production system. 
 
In such situations, the exclusion of small-scale farms from access to extension services cannot 
be compensated for by mechanisms of knowledge dissemination. The very production of that 
knowledge is indissoluble from the establishment of service relations between farmers and 
advisers. These findings reinforce the importance of micro-economic studies on small farms' 
access to advice, not in terms of "channels of information flows", but by analysing situations 
of co-production of knowledge institutionalised in extension services. As we will see, taking 
the particular characteristics of service relations into account makes it easier to grasp the 
implications of the reorganizations of extension services for small farms, and to interpret 
certain empirical findings that may seem paradoxical. 
 
3.2. Interdependency of supply and demand of intangible service. Cumulative effects in 
the exclusion of small farms. 
 
Particular properties of service relations can have cumulative effects in the dynamics of small 
farms' exclusion from extension services. 
 
The  emergence  of  new  requests  for  advice,  which  results  from  interactions  between 
extensionists and potential beneficiaries of extension services, may run counter to regulation 
by the market that implies a clearly formulated demand, independent of the offer. Studies 
undertaken  from  various  theoretical  angles  emphasize  this  point,  i.e.  the  interdependence 
between the supply and the demand in extension services. The idea is found in many models, 
whether  they  represent  extension  services  as  co-producing  knowledge  or  as  supplying 
information.  In  the  case  of  a  representation  of  advice  as  a  vector  of  information,  some 
Frisvold some al. (2000) have proposed a sequential model of interdependence of supply and 
demand in extension services
5. 
 
In  representations  of  advice  as  a  service  relationship  co-producing  knowledge,  Goffman 
(1968)  noted  that  this  relationship  follows  a  cycle  of  reparation 
(observation/diagnosis/prescription/treatment).  But  the  particularity  of  intangible  services 
                                                 
5 The farmer's demand at visit t+1 depends on the stock of information that the extensionist has and transmits to 
him/her at visit t. The increase in the stock of the extensionist's information depends on the farmer's requests at 
time t, which orientates the extensionist's information searches between t and t+1.   11 
such as advice is the joint action of the adviser and the farmer for each of these operations, 
including for the identification of problems at the origin of the demand. A farmer cannot 
always  express  his/her  problems  with  precision,  nor  know  that  a  recent  technological 
breakthrough could help to overcome a problem that is so recurrent there seems to be no 
solution. Supply and demand are co-constructed in interpersonal interactions, especially when 
tacit knowledge is involved (Nonaka, 1994). Moreover, coordination authorities contribute to 
socializing and accumulating the fruits of this co-construction. 
 
Consequently,  even  when  extension  services  are  free  or  subsidized,  the  absence  of 
coordination authorities to link small farms' productive situations to the knowledge available 
at a given point in time, can make it even more difficult to express a demand (Laurent et al., 
2006). It is therefore impossible to directly interpret small farms' weak access to extension 
services – even when they are free – to a lack of interest or to the fact that the farms do not 
encounter the technical problems to which such services could provide solutions. 
 
Due to the failure to take this phenomenon into account, in certain situations a vicious circle 
is triggered off: the growing marginalization of small farms in extension support programmes, 
partially a  result of the disappearance of coordination bodies on which those  farms were 
formerly represented, makes the emergence of a demand for advice increasingly difficult. 
Even when grants do exist, the farmers concerned do not know what  type of demand to 
emphasize most. This attitude can be interpreted as a lack of need for advice and therefore 
lead to an even more drastic reduction of resources allocated to this target public. 
 
Such phenomena have been observed in Spain and the UK (Laurent et al., 2006). They also 
suggest the need to be cautious when analysing the results of subsidized programmes such as 
those run in Tuscany (Section 1, Figure 2) and, more generally, to  look further than the 
interpretation of a weak demand for advice. This situation can be illustrated again by the 
problem  of  contamination  of  small  farms'  cereal  crops  by  mycotoxins.  Field  research 
(Labarthe, 2006a) has shown that: (i) small farms were poorly informed of the very existence 
of this sanitary problem, whereas it was a leading topic in discussions between extensionists 
and farmers with bigger farms; (ii) consequently, requests for technical support from this 
group of farmers was almost non-existent; and finally (iii) in R&D systems supporting back-
office extension services, no technical solution was discussed directly with small farmers, 
with a view to setting up trials to test solutions for fungal diseases, adapted to the constraints 
of their production systems. 
 
4. TRANSFORMATION OF INVESTMENTS IN BACK-OFFICE SUPPORT CAN BE 
TO SMALL FARMS' DETRIMENT 
 
Economic researches about extension privatization mostly compare the efficiency of public 
versus private extension at a micro level (Dinar and al., 2007)? They focus on front-office 
resources  and  left  back-offices  changes  in  the  dark.  An  original  aspect  of  institutional 
analyses is that they show how profound changes related to the privatization of extension 
services  concern  above  all  these  back-office  activities.  Our  hypothesis  is  that  these 
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4.1 The back-office of agricultural extension services: cornerstone of extension services 
in the years of agricultural modernization 
 
Some approaches (institutional economics, innovation studies) have highlighted the key role 
of  back-office  activities  in  the  success  of  public  extension  services  during  the  period  of 
agricultural  modernization  (Labarthe  2009).  They  have  shown  that  extension  back-office 
activities  act  in  different  countries  as  a  driving  force  between  popularizers  in  the  field, 
technicians  and  engineers  at  the  experimental  stations,  and  researchers  in  universities  or 
higher agronomic institutes (Rölling, 1988). Back-office activities have thus facilitated real 
co-production of knowledge between these actors, embodied in various material media: joint 
management of experimental stations, numerous joint technical publications, and so on. 
 
But this co-production has a high cost: agriculture has the characteristics of a heavy industry, 
due  to  its  high  levels  of  investment  and  operating  costs.  The  validation  of  innovative 
agricultural techniques and practices requires costly experiments that someone has to be able 
to finance. For this reason, the post-WWII years witnessed a combination of large public 
investments and  a  mutualization  of  farmers'  collective  investments  in  experimentation,  in 
many European countries. This was cemented by a system of joint management of the applied 
research institutes and experimental stations, by the state and farmers' unions. 
 
4.2 The state's disengagement transforms back-office activities of extension services and 
undermines agricultural extension systems 
 
The reorganization of agricultural extension services, related to the state's disengagement, 
resulted first in a change of extension service providers. For example, in regions of France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, three types of extensionists are now the leading players in 
extension service delivery to cereal production (Labarthe, 2006b): (i) firms and cooperatives 
that sell inputs for farmers (seeds, fertilizers, phytosanitary products); (ii) private consultants; 
and (iii) firms commercializing software for agronomic modelling, used to forecast the impact 
of agricultural practices and to help farmers to design an optimal technical itinerary. 
 
The services (including back-office activities) of these various service providers are funded 
directly by farmers (Labarthe 2006a). In the case of input suppliers, the cost of services is 
integrated into the trading of material inputs and outputs with the farmers. In the second case, 
of private consultants, farmers are billed directly and individually for services. In the third 
case, the farmers pay for the software. But these new service providers not only transform the 
cost  of  services  for  farmers;  they  are  also  accompanied  by  the  emergence  of  new  profit 
strategies  and  new  logics  of  service  delivery.  For  suppliers  of  inputs,  this  logic  is 
characterized by a segmentation of the service offer: the idea is to match the intensity of 
service  relations  proposed  to  farmers  (number  of  visits,  time  spent  by  visit),  as  well  as 
possible  with  the  volumes  of  turnover  obtained  with  them.  For  private  consultants,  in  a 
context of fewer and fewer farms, profitability is based on a strategy of personalization of 
services to ensure the loyalty of a more limited segment of specialized and solvent farms. At 
the same time they limit all investments and staff costs which are not directly involved in 
face-to-face, billed interaction with the client. Finally, for the software firms, profitability 
depends on the contrary on their capacity to write a program which produces reliable forecasts 
while reducing the working time devoted to direct interactions with clients. 
 
The new logics of private consultants are thus not only transforming the conditions of access 
to and delivery of service relations, but also profoundly modifying their back-office activities.   13 
This can be illustrated by their investments in R&D for validating technical solutions to limit 
the concentration of mycotoxin in cereals. In the case of software firms, back-office activities 
consist essentially  of  scientific  watch  (based  on  the  international  databases  of  agronomic 
journals). But due to their small size, these firms cannot invest directly in experiments or 
research enabling them to link up pedoclimatic data, agricultural practices, and the risk of 
mycotoxins. Such experiments are carried out by the back-offices of input suppliers, which 
directly test the effectiveness of solutions for their clients. For that purpose they rely on the 
joint  investments  of  the  phytopharmaceutical  industries  which  supply  them  with  seeds, 
pesticides and fertilizers, and help them in implementing experimental protocols. Finally, the 
case of private consultants, which embody the purest form of commercialization of services, 
is more radical, for they carry out no local experimentation whatsoever. Knowledge (e.g. on a 
new  problem  such  as  mycotoxins)  is  renewed  almost exclusively  through  the  renewal  of 
advisers' competencies (by ongoing training of their advisers, or recruitment of new young 
advisers, graduates of agricultural schools offering highly specialized qualifications). 
 
In  the  final  analysis,  the  reorganization  of  extension  services  induced  by  the  state's 
disengagement has resulted in four major transformations of back-office activities (Labarthe 
2009): i) fewer investments by extensionists in local experimentation and scientific watch; ii) 
greater dependence on highly sector-based investments; especially from industries upstream 
(phytopharmaceutical and seeds) or downstream (cereal trade), which finance a large number 
of tests, iii)less organized control in the form of feedback by farmers on applied research 
through agricultural extension services; iv) a shift from a logic of joint management and 
systematic funding to one of calls for projects that are resolutely more short-term and ad hoc. 
In turn, the applied research institutes behave increasingly as private firm commercializing 
their services in a highly segmented way, to different clients. This situation is very likely to be 
severely detrimental to the interests of small-scale farms. Deprived of easy access to advice, 
they have even less influence and impact on back-office support. And if back-offices end up 
being controlled by purely sectoral interests, there is little chance of relevant knowledge being 




Because of the new content of rural policies (combining goals of  social cohesion and  of 
environment protection), the question of the reproduction of small-scale farms is back on the 
economics  research  agenda.  At  the  same  time,  EU  food  safety  regulations  induce  new 
problems  for  farmer,  which  appeal  for  technical  solutions  that  may  be  scale  dependant. 
Nevertheless, little attention is paid to the specific knowledge needs of small farms. In that 
respect we proposed to combine the outcomes of the regulationnist institutional economics 
framework with the interdisciplinary findings about the specificity of services, in order to 
assess the consequence of extension privatization in Europe on small-scale farms. Such a 
framework  has  produced  three  main  results.  First,  privatization  leads  to  a  situation  of 
invisibility  of  small  farms  as  far  as  the  definition  of  extension  services  target  public  is 
concerned. Second, the question of small farms’ access to services can not be reduced to a 
short-term cost problem: their exclusion from front-office situations enabling a co-production 
of knowledge can also have long-term and cumulative effects. Third, these effects concern the 
very content of the knowledge accumulated thanks to extension back-office activities, which 
may become less and less relevant for small-scale farm due to an increase of its growing 
control by sector-based interests. 
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ANNEX 1 Proportion of agricultural holdings with fewer than 8 ESU for the type of faming 13 
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ANNEX 2 Trajectories of withdrawal of the state from extension programs in Europe and consequences for the debate about the 
definition of the target of the services (Source: Laurent et al., 2006, Labarthe, 2006a, Vagnozzi and Aguglia, 2005
6). 
Trajectories  Funding  Implementation  Programming  Nature of debates on the 
publics targeted 
Countries in which 
this policy is 
dominant 
From a national logic 
towards devolution 
National public  Creation of local 
centres 
Ministry of agriculture  Duality between rural 
enterprises with farming 





delegation of services 
From co-funding by 







Association Nationale de Développement 
Agricole (ANDA), the joint 
state/farmers' union organization, was 
dissolved and replaced by a special 
account at the ministry of agriculture 
Reflection on the inclusion 
of farms formely excluded 
from developement actions 















Replacement of a policy supporting 
extension supply through a devolved 
national fund; towards direct subsidies to 
farmers to help them finance their 
demand of extension; delegation of 
services funded by the provinces 
Continue modernization in a 
situation of very wide 
structural heterogeneity 
Certain regions in 
Italy (Tuscany), Spain 
(Estramadura) or 
Germany (Thuringe) 








managed by the 
farmers' union 
Contractualization of the objectives of 
the extension services missions 
delegated by the state to the extension 
service provider 
Union strongly represented 
on farms. Few debates on 





Direct billing of 
farmers for services 
Private companies  None. State and profession hand over 
advisory activities to private consultants. 
Marginal residual funding of 
communication campaigns on 
environmental topics. 
None. Debates focused on 
environmental topics or 





                                                 
6 Vagnozzi, A., Aguglia, L. The system of the Italian rural development services and the new European policies. 17th European Seminar on Education and Extension (ESEE). 
Izmir, Turkey. 30 August – 3 September 2005.   18 
ANNEX 3 
Methodological note, Figure 1:  
- The primary data come from the French Agricultural Census for the Rhône-Alpes Region carried out in 2000 
(56962 agricultural holdings in 2000). Results from various processings of these data were published in Laurent, 
Mundler 2005 (available on line) and Mundler et al 2006. 
- Each value corresponds to the percentage of the number of farms in each class. For instance, 25,4% of farms 
larger than 100 ESU benefit from the services of an adviser. 
- A farm is considered as benefiting from extension services when it has at least three contacts per year with an 
adviser (phone or direct interpersonal interaction). 
- Development organization stands here for “co-managed” extension organizations, co-financed by the state and 
by farmers, i.e. chambers of agricultures, livestock extension (établissement de l’élevage), farmers’ circles of 
extension (groupements de vulgarisation agricole) 
 
Methodological note, Figure 2:  
- The numbers of farms in Tuscany come from the Eurofarm data base (built from the National Agricultural 
Census and Farm Structure Surveys)(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/agriculture/data/database 
- The numbers of farmers' demands for subsidized extension services come from a data base built by researchers 
of the faculty of agriculture of Pisa (Patrizia Proeitti and Gianluca Brunori). Results are published in yearly 
reports by Regione Toscana (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).  